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 Contesting a tradition deeply ingrained in media studies, which 
conceives of news and current-affairs programming not only as a reli-
able, but also a sufficient platform for a mediated enhancement of the 
democratic ideal of plurality (in a representational realm which many 
members of society find devoid of enjoyment and consequently ig-
nore), this paper seeks to explore how ‘mass’ entertainment texts are 
able to provide subsidiary platforms for debate on society’s relevant 
issues. From this standpoint, the ‘reading’ of popular media texts on 
the micropolitical level (the capitalist consumerist setting notwith-
standing) is potentially useful to democracy on the macropolitical 
level. Although popular texts are ardently condemned by ‘mass cul-
ture theory’ and confined to the realm of mere profit-motivated irra-
tional pleasures, they are nonetheless involved in rational deliberation 
of popular culture consumers engaging with texts as active citizens. 
The powers and limitations of “democratic entertainment”, a para-
digm recently emergent in political communication, will be assessed 
in a case study of the game/talk show “The Pyramid”, co-produced 
by Croatian public service Television (‘HRT’) and ‘Castor 
Multimedia’, as a text which boldly confronts entertainment 
audiences, prime-time celebrities and current-affairs politicians in 
informed discussions on the nation’s pertinent issues. 
 
Key words: democratic entertainment, televised debate, game talk-show 
“The Pyramid”, public service radio-television, mass media, 
popular culture, mass culture theory 
 
* Zlatan Krajina, Ph.D. candidate at Goldsmiths’ College, University of London. Before 
earning MA degree in Media and Communications at Goldsmiths in 2007, he had been working 
at Croatian public service radiotelevision (HRT) as news producer, presenter and documentary 
author for seven years. 
 
180 Krajina, Z., Democratic Potentials of Media Entertainment: …                                                                                                                            




 There is a tradition deeply ingrained in media studies, which conceives 
of news and current-affairs programming as vital to democracy inasmuch as 
it provides not only a reliable, but also a sufficient platform for mediated en-
hancement of the ideal of plurality. At the same time, theoretical debates im-
pregnate this classic notion of the role which ‘informational’ programming 
plays in society with a value-laden denotation of ‘rationality’ – the corner 
stone of democratic ‘debate’ and ‘choice’. The ardently guarded limitation 
of reach of these so-called pillars of democracy to the genres of ‘informa-
tion’ – a representational realm generically devoid of imagination, and there-
fore, needless to say, of interest amongst many members of society – paved 
the path to an affirmation of an impervious dichotomy of ‘rationality’ (re-
served for the news and current affairs) and ‘irrationality’ (as the domain of 
entertainment is commonly labelled). Therefore, what is at stake here is not 
only the question of whether entertainment, as many venture to speculate, 
really is or is not the news’ second best1, but also the constant tendency to 
associate the entire range of mass-appealing texts with the notion of an ever 
impotent and powerless domain of mere amusement. Our starting point, and 
one of the key theoretical contributions in this respect, is Raymond Wil-
liams’s assessment of the usage of the prefix mass in terming media as mass-
media and democracy as mass-democracy, whereby ‘the mass’ is effectively 
substituted for ‘the mob’ – traditionally depicted as fickle, gullible and of 
questionable taste and habits (1973: 297-301). Thus, having in mind Wil-
liams’s denouncement of “massing” as “less a product of democracy than its 
denial” (ibid. 304), our consideration of democratic potentials sublimed in 
the socially shared enjoyments must reach beyond the primary effect (and 
etiquette) of ‘amusement’.  
 A closer look at media entertainment uncovers a field of intense exercise 
of power over the selection, access and use of mediated social representa-
tions in countless socially relevant ways, either as class maintenance, market 
development, or citizenship performance, to mention but a few. This paper 
advocates the latter understanding, by exploring some possibilities of how 
‘mass’ entertainment texts can function as subsidiary platforms to the re-
nowned ‘informational’ fields of debate on society’s relevant issues. Such an 
approach focuses on ‘democratic uses’ of entertainment, for which the term 
 
1 Expression borrowed from David Hesmondhalgh (2005). 
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“democratic entertainment”, coined by James Curran2, seems to be the most 
serviceable sublimation of various interdisciplinary inputs. Generally, I am 
inclined to group them in three respective and overlapping planes: cultural 
studies, political economy of media and political communications, the tra-
jectories of which are addressed in the first and the second parts of this pa-
per. The third part consists of a case study, in which I analyse the game/talk 
show “The Pyramid”, broadcast on Croatian public service television 
(“HRT”), as a text that successfully engages entertainment audiences, prime-
time celebrities and current-affairs politicians alike, in informed discussions 
on the nation’s hot-button issues of the week. The case study will serve to 
assess the possibilities of entertainment-driven debate to nurture choice 
steered towards democracy. 
 
Entertaining consumers and citizens 
Negotiating Culture 
 There seems to be a conceptual overlapping in the meaning and reach of 
how media theory conceptualises entertainment. Neither of the domains di-
rectly connected with entertainment, namely, cultural industries (Hesmond-
halgh, 2002), with the corresponding discussions drawing upon political 
economy, and popular culture (Strinati, 1995), which stems from cultural 
studies3, provides a clear definition of media entertainment. However, the 
three strands share a working logic, which secures an insightful contextuali-
sation of the place of media entertainment in the present moment. Dick Heb-
dige’s observation of “popular culture” as “a set of generally available arte-
facts” including clothes, television programmes, music records, means of 
transportation, and many other exemplifications of the Western ‘popular’ 
(1998: 47) and ‘quotidian’ (Fiske, 1989a), signals such a relation. Commu-
nication theory instructs us that all of this variability is underpinned by the 
effect of providing the audiences with enjoyment (Vorderer et al., 2004: 390-
394). Still, ever since the medieval emergence of market economy, and up to 
contemporary “hypercommercialism” (McChesney, 1999: 77), the publicly 
produced and dispensed enjoyments are often publicly denounced as ‘bread 
and circus’, according to the byword that originated in ancient Rome. Possi-
 
2 From the lecture delivered at Goldsmiths College, University of London, on 5 February 
2007. 
3 Hesmondhalgh utterly rejects such a classification (or simplification, as it were), insisting, 
quite rightly, that it neglects a whole range of debates pertaining to fields which cannot be un-
equivocally assigned to political economy or cultural studies (2002: 41-42). In this paper, how-
ever, a simplified approach is maintained in order to provide the reader with a readily available 
overview of the most outspoken enquiries. The case study throws into sharp relief the inter-
twining nature of all above-mentioned strands. 
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bly this largely coincides with the view that media entertainment, when 
studied as part of ‘popular culture’, is inextricably linked to the advent of 
‘mass culture’ in the 1920s and 1930s (Strinati, 1995). 
 Theoretical debates have largely been directed by the divide between the 
camps of ‘mass culture theory’ and its ‘critique’ (cf. ibid.). Mass industriali-
sation that fostered increasing urbanisation and introduced the means for 
mechanical reproduction of art, such as photography and film (Benjamin, 
1999), caused an irreversible demise of direct, communal identity breeding 
through the village, the church and the family, in favour of the social and 
moral ‘atomisation’ of individuals (Strinati, 1995). The process was under-
stood as: 
[an] amoral immediacy of rational individualism and secular anomie 
associated with the rise of mass consumption and mass culture, the 
moral placebos of a mass society (ibid. 4-10).  
 As citizenship rights were expanded and elementary education was made 
universal, the ‘mass culture’ theory was shocked by the collapse of the sys-
tem which strictly separated ‘high art’ and ‘folk’ cultures from ‘mass cul-
ture’ (ibid. 7). Bringing into connection the mass production of cultural arte-
facts, based on standardised formulae that are bound to create mass appeal 
(cf. Adorno, 1969), all of which evokes the idea of industrial assembly lines, 
the said theory argued that ‘mass culture’ ubiquitously destabilised the 
uniqueness of art and folk, with unprecedented consequences to the aesthetic 
hierarchies of the time (as determined by the intellectual authorities, such as 
the Frankfurt School) (ibid. 8, 11, 42). The fundamental objection was, at 
least performatively, based on the argument that ‘mass culture’ markets its 
products solely to make profit, and incites its consumers to indulge in “triv-
ial, … immediate and false pleasures” (ibid. 10-14)4. Here the audience is 
perceived as a mere “mass of passive consumers, prone to the manipulative 
persuasions of the mass media”, that lack any intellectual challenge (ibid. 12, 
14). 
 Most of the ‘mass culture’ theory has largely been rejected. Critics have 
denounced it as an expression of the intellectual elites’ aim to maintain their 
class position (ibid. 34)5, in fear of what Hebdige termed a “cultural de-
 
4 Compare with Richard Hoggart’s (1958) classic account on the cultural ‘threat’ of mass 
culture and the alleged ‘Americanisation’ of the post-war British working-class community. 
5 The argument correlates to the post-Marxist accounts of the “symbolic struggle” 
(Bourdieu, 1992) between classes, being a part of the omnipresent battle over defining the world 
through media in accordance with specific interests (Hall, 1977). These approaches have gone 
through a considerable decline in theoretical discussions, but have been offered scarce alterna-
tives (cf. Couldry, 2003) in more recent debates. Here the paradigm services an operational con-
sideration necessary for the subsequent assessment of the potential of the popular to contest the 
field of dominant discourses (cf. Fiske, 1989a). See also Thompson (1995) and Storey (1999). 
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cline”, which would bring about a discontinuation of “moral and aesthetic 
absolutes” (1988: 66, 71). In this way the ‘mass culture’ theory light-heart-
edly overlooked the principal social contexts in which mass culture was not 
only consumed, but also appreciated (Strinati, 1995: 39-40). The theory also 
neglected palpable tensions that arose within ‘mass culture’ itself, such as 
the feminist and minorities’ discursive critiques (cf. ibid. 184-196). At this 
point, the ‘mass culture’ theory critique is well aware of the growing spec-
trum of genres and texts, which are being interpreted in a variety of ways by 
different groups (cf. ibid. 40). Moreover, it is now commonly acknowledged 
that (the uniqueness of art notwithstanding), popular culture also engages 
with “symbolic creativity”, as Hesmondhalgh termed it, which “can enrich 
people’s lives – even though it often doesn’t” (2002: 5, original emphasis). 
Therefore, it would not be an overstatement to claim that the shift in the 
‘mass culture’ discourse makes it evident that “politics are central to the 
analysis of popular culture” (Strinati, 1995: 46). Evoking Williams’s (1973) 
contention from the Introduction to this paper, it becomes clear that the 
‘mass culture’ theory exercises its symbolic power precisely when it claims 
to be speaking for the masses (cf. Bourdieu, 1992), or “attempting to set 
down guidelines for cultural discrimination” (Strinati, 1995: 42)6. In Stri-
nati’s words, 
it is the power of the mass, not its lack of power, which is emphasised 
[by the theory of mass culture], but it is not welcomed or celebrated 
(1995: 42, 9). 
 Media entertainment functioned as a symbolic transposition of identity 
and class struggle, deconstructed in the light of the mass culture theory and 
its critique. That which the intellectual elites at first associated with disem-
powering the public (Adorno, 1991: 98-106), was later recognised as power-
endowing (Fiske, 1989b: 161) to all members of society7. Thus, the initial 
critics were recognised as short-sighted and almost mythically abstract (Stri-
nati, 1995: 74-85), and they failed to keep entertainment-related texts outside 
of academic relevance. Popular media contents are nowadays studied8, and 
appreciated9 as invaluable reservoirs of cultural identity negotiations10.  
 
6 Cf. Bourdieu (1984). 
7 Jim McGuigan conceptualised this kind of social inclusiveness as “cultural populism”, 
which conceives of ordinary people as “active pleasure-seekers and trusts in the good sense of 
their judgement”, whereas the ‘elitists’ are, in this context, thought of as “disrespectful of ordi-
nary people’s tastes” (1992: 38, 2). See also Williams (1997), and Harrington and Bielby (2001: 
2-11). 
8 See McGuigan (1992). For instance, Clint C. Wilson II and Félix Guitérrez resorted to 
media entertainment texts in their study of the social portrayal of American ‘non-Whites’ in 
films and series from World War I onwards (1995: 61-106). Still, this did not exhaust the possi-
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 In line with the premises of the ‘mass culture’ theory, which emphasises 
profit-driven cultural production, the American model of mass audiovisual 
entertainment has been singled out as highly instructive (if not disruptive, for 
Frankfurt school’s pessimists) in understanding media entertainment as a 
cultural and economic force11. More specifically, the American system is of-
ten thought to be exemplifying the geography of cultural relations wherein 
“[television’s] primary customers are the advertisers whose business is to 
rent the eyeballs of the audience” (Gitlin, 1983: 3). In a classic media studies 
account on fierce struggles in which restless producers of three major USA 
television networks fight for market shares, Todd Gitlin’s informant asserts: 
“I am not interested in culture. (…) I have only one interest. That’s whether 
people watch the program” (ibid. 25, 31). In such a market-determined cul-
tural production, determined by the urge to predict what mass audiences 
really want, extensive audience research seemingly minimised the risk of 
failure12, but, in turn, increased the producers’ uncertainty about what would 
attract most viewers (ibid. 47-55, 19-23). Although Gitlin’s exposition runs 
the risk of degrading into a blind alley of the ‘mass culture’ theory, where it 
could remain autistically ignorant of the abundance of audiences’ activities 
practiced upon the texts, his account goes beyond perceiving the noted cul-
tural products as dedicated exclusively to profit-making. Script writers were 
indeed compelled to obey the producers’ directives and write conventionally 
in order to endorse mass appeal, rather than challenge it, but the films and 
series still managed to cast some light on American social agendas, or, as 
Gitlin himself acknowledged, to draw upon certain aspects of ‘reality’ (ibid. 
12, 104-105). As revenues flourished, the thrust of competition and public 
 
bilities of reading media entertainment texts as active social platforms for negotiating the recur-
ring agenda. 
9 Contrast, for example, an early condemnation of rock ’n’ roll music as “mindless pap” 
(quoted in Strinati, 1995: 46) with a recent news headline stating: “The Rolling Stones as Na-
tional Heritage” (Net.hr, 2007; my translation). The latter refers to the proposal of the American 
Congress to preserve the Rolling Stones music in the National Recording Registry as a histori-
cally important cultural artefact. Nota bene, the candidature was initiated by American ‘mass 
audiences’. 
10 This strand of debate falls outside the scope of this article. For a more detailed outline, 
see Frith (2000). 
11 See also Croteau and Hoynes (2000). 
12 Perspectives on this matter are not unified. Nord (2006) pleads for stronger recognition of 
the producers’ power over the content of cultural products, insisting that the formulae which the 
producers hold on to in order to minimise the risk and increase their profit are more likely to re-
flect their values, than those of the audience. The producers, as Nord argues, standardise pro-
duction and impose formulae that “may only approximate what people ‘really want’” (ibid. 219, 
original emphasis). Nord suggests that standardization increases along with a producer’s market 
power and his ability to control risk (ibid.). 
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response of minorities allowed for palpable, albeit still minor detachments 
from the money-gaining formulae.  
 The advent of new technologies offered new possibilities that, arguably, 
contested the inherited status quo. Cable and satellite broadcasting, espe-
cially with the growing range of digital programmes, allowed for a consider-
able multiplication of channels. Television business launched ‘premier 
channels’, viewed by monthly subscribers. This has led to what Curran rec-
ognised13 as “ maximising intensity of satisfaction, so that viewers are per-
suaded to pay extra for a different and better product”, or, more broadly, a 
“new wave” in American television business. One of the most outspoken 
programmes recognised in academic debates are series such as “Sex and the 
City” and “Sopranos”, which have been providing media studies with a 
readable texture of contemporary cultural discussions on ‘third way femi-
nism’ and postmodern identities (Henry, 2004), and morality and psycho-
analysis, respectively (Willis, 2002). However, if history teaches us about 
the present and the future, the possible “new wave” episode could sceptically 
be linked to Gitlin’s conclusion from the early 1980s: “[when] technology 
opens doors, (…) oligopoly marches in just behind, slamming them” (1983: 
332). 
 We cannot take into account all the complexities characterising con-
temporary cultural industries, because it would take us too far from the out-
lined agenda, but for the purpose of supplying a tenable context in which we 
may consider how media entertainment actively works within Western de-
mocratic systems, we must note some basic issues in recurring debates. On 
the face of it, the vast majority of studies agree that, since the 1980s,  
cultural industries have moved closer to the centre of the economic 
action in many countries and across much of the world (Hesmond-
halgh, 2002: 1).  
 Cultural industries operate across national borders, acquiring commercial 
development hand in hand with new communication technologies, adver-
tisement practices and audience researches (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). Niche 
markets, with television texts as most prominent entertainment providers, 
and with stars as their key promotion attributes, are some of the main conti-
nuities which have been affected over the past two decades by changes such 
as policy deregulation and increasing segmentation of audiences (ibid.). By 
inter-relating the economic aspects of cultural production and its social ef-
fects, in the recognition that “culture is produced and consumed under capi-
talism as a fundamental issue in explaining inequalities of power, prestige 
and profit” (ibid. 30-31), critical political economy effectively makes it eas-
 
13 From the lecture delivered at Goldsmiths College, University of London, on 23 February 
2007. 
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ier to delineate the scope of research into the democratic potentials of media 
entertainment.  
 It is a common place in critical political economy that the modernist in-
crease in leisure time and spare income have given rise to a considerable 
growth of entertainment production, with high costs of producing original 
texts, and low costs of reproducing them innumerably (Hesmondhalgh, 
2005: 161; 2002: 4-19). Since, however, the audience does not have an infi-
nite amount of time, more and more products are fighting for one’s attention 
(Wolf, 1999: 24-26), pushing entertainment, in the words of Michael J. 
Wolf, American entertainment business consultant, to “the forefront of eco-
nomic growth” in a number of countries (ibid. 4-5)14. On the other hand, en-
tertainment is still identified as “a small component of a country’s economy 
– though not, of course, of its culture” (Hesmondhalgh, 2005: 162). Thus, 
political economy of mass media is well aware that entertainment products 
“provide us with recurring representations of the world and thus act as a kind 
of reporting” (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 3), which brings the discussion of en-
tertainment and society closer to the contentious field of political communi-
cations, an aspect to which I now must turn. 
 
Challenging power and politics 
 Similarly to the ‘mass culture’ theory, political communications also 
took a considerably long route to recognising entertainment’s democratic 
potential. The theoretical domain that is in question has been conceptualising 
the media in relation to the process of democracy as the vital force in ena-
bling the citizens’ ‘rational choice’, by providing them with different views 
on relevant occurrences in their environment (McNair, 1999: 17, 21). How-
ever, the fulfilment of that task has been securely kept within the realm of 
informational programming (news, current affairs, panel discussions, etc.) 
and its operational imperatives. To a certain degree, the genesis of such an 
assumption takes us back to the modernist positions of intellectual elites that 
insulate media entertainment on the grounds of its alleged detrimental effects 
on democracy (cf. van Zoonen, 2005). This assumes various forms in public 
discourse, such as “video malaise”, “mediocracy”, “dumbing down”, 
 
14 Extant data favor this claim. According to Pricewaterhouse Coopers’ outlook forecasts, 
by 2010 revenues will jump globally, reaching, for instance, $104 billion in ‘filmed entertain-
ment’, $117 billion in magazine publishing, $48 billion in ‘recorded music’ and $226 billion in 
‘television networks’. This reflects a 3 to 12 percent compound annual growth rate (PWC Pub-
lications, 2007). A Crisil report suggests that the media and entertainment industry in India is 
expected to double its revenues to Rs 744 billion (Economic Times-India Times, 2007).  
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“soundbite politics”, or “celebrity politics”, to name a few (ibid. 123, 143)15. 
In par with the development of oral and folk culture, to which the advent of 
popular culture is inextricably linked, the roots of political participation are 
found in literacy, which allowed political elites to claim that popular culture 
and political communications developed as fundamentally separate domains 
(ibid. 144-145, 189-190), and ultimately to leave entertainment outside the 
rational realm (Curran, 2000: 139). This, to a certain extent, appears to be 
reminiscent of the previously discussed persistence of ‘elite intellectuals’ in 
defending the modernist system of values and hierarchies from a constant 
challenge lurking in the realm of the popular. Discussions in the last several 
decades have made it irrevocably evident that reduction of the potential for 
nurturing civic ideals through media to the realm of informational program-
ming leaves scholars blind to a tacit exclusion fostered by the old approach, 
in which citizens highly indifferent to the modes and aesthetics of news and 
panels were excluded from the information and discussion arena (van 
Zoonen, 2005: 2-4, 144). For self-evident reasons, this tendency was deemed 
dangerous to the principles of participation and inclusion, and, albeit the 
elitist prejudicial thinking is still present in various forms, there is an ever-
stronger agreement regarding the need for democratic politics to acquire the 
interest of more general citizens via ‘mass media’ texts (ibid. 7). The latter 
approach ascertains that the source of representation is fundamentally “the 
people” (ibid. 144).  
 Contemporary practice in political communication has been registering 
extensive evidence that the politicians engage with practices of popular cul-
ture in order to reach voters. This is sufficiently illustrated by, say, their us-
age of private language (i.e. of the rhetoric that refers to private life) in tele-
vision talk shows, and the utilisation of popular songs in presidential cam-
paigns (van Zoonen, 1998). Obviously, political elites are prone to acknowl-
edging the social importance of popular culture when voting results are at 
stake. A variety of genres (from satire, chat shows, punk and rap music to 
conspiracy films) draws on and engages with politics (Street, 2001: 61, 79). 
Thus discussions on mediated opinion-making and the inherent power rela-
tions shed light on the “democratic potential of popular culture” (Hermes, 
2005: 4), whereby media entertainment works as one possible wherewithal 
of “collective self-management” (Curran, 2000: 139), providing the society 
with “cognitive maps of reality” (ibid.).  
 Liesbet Van Zoonen offers some tenable operationalisations of the pro-
posed concept of ‘democratic entertainment’ by exploring “what kind of 
civic virtues can be evoked and maintained through popular culture” (2005: 
15). Van Zoonen (2005) looked at Internet discussions following the broad-
cast of ‘West Wing’, an American television drama, which spotlights every-
 
15 Compare with Strinati (2000: 152-158). 
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day politics in the White House. After viewing the show, fans would engage 
with critical discussions on extant politics, linking the real office-holders 
with their fictional transpositions in the television drama (2005: 123). Thus, 
the screened material of ‘West Wing’ functioned for van Zoonen’s infor-
mants as a resource for “discussing, criticizing, and imagining politics for 
the performance of citizenship” (ibid. 124). For instance, a discussion after 
viewing the film “Primary Colours”, in the eyes of the viewer unfolded re-
semblance of the film plot to Bill Clinton’s presidential career and his 
misbehaviours in personal life, which, in turn, helped the viewers understand 
his presidency better (ibid.). The following excerpts will serve as an illustra-
tion:  
The story does an amazing job of explaining the unexplainable Bill 
Clinton. Can a good politician win without doing some amoral 
things? … This film made me think about Clinton as well as politi-
cians in general. What is admirable, what is it we really want our 
public officials to be? (quoted in van Zoonen, 2005: 128-129) 
 Van Zoonen’s analysis suggests that the participants in these discussions 
drew on resources of a much wider scope than the film itself was able to 
provide; in other words, the entertainment content tended to help the viewers 
to compile a much broader media discourse (ibid. 129), thus creating a plat-
form for discussion. The open and critical exchange of ideas signposted an 
effective means of performing citizenship (ibid. 137). 
 However, the reach of post-screening discussions was not unlimited. 
They remained confined to a rather general ground, sharpening the individ-
ual views, but not linking the ideas extracted from the viewed programmes 
to more particular issues in real politics (ibid. 138-139). This brings us to 
another key instance in considering ‘democratic entertainment’, namely the 
need to examine what the voters do with entertainment, rather than what en-
tertainment does to voters (ibid. 123). As van Zoonen points out, much of 
the ‘non-democratic representations’, such as sexism and racism, remain 
present to a varying degree in the entertainment texts (ibid. 150). For this 
reason, greater caution is required in assessing the democratic potentials of 
consuming entertainment texts. It is important to bear in mind, as John Fiske 
noted, that, “just as power is not distributed equally in society, so potential 
meanings are not distributed equally in texts” (1989b: 168). The latter con-
tention serves not to redirect our discussion to the questions of mass media 
effects and audience research, but to signal a set of arguments that – stem-
ming from the contentious field of media consumption – necessarily compli-
cates our treatment of media entertainment texts, if we are to remain in the 
field of media studies. 
 On the one hand, entertainment is seen as the ultimate tool of the ruling 
ideologies for manipulating citizens, whereby, as Michael Parenti (1992: 
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198-213) outlines, entertainment audiences are virtually nothing more than 
passive masses. Fiske, on the other hand, has no doubt about a progressive 
potential of popular culture on the micropolitical level, where popular cul-
ture can empower the citizens to redistribute power in their favour (1989b: 
161). This particularly takes effect when people, as Fiske details, selectively 
and productively talk about a viewed programme; when, in fact, they talk 
“back to the media” (ibid. 174). This embodies much of what Fiske recog-
nises as the “productivity of popular culture” (ibid.). An exemplifying case 
are ‘gossip networks’ through which women can evaluate and discuss pro-
feminine and anti-masculine meanings in a soap opera, and thus establish a 
form of solidarity with others (ibid. 172). Fiske argues that such micropoliti-
cal resistance may induce social conditions for macropolitical action (ibid.). 
The third line of arguments, to which our approach is mostly inclined, holds 
considerable reservations to such an opposition (e.g. Robins, 1994), because 
the suggested bifurcation tends to oversee the need to be “sensitive to both 
the ‘vertical’ dimension of power and ideology and the ‘horizontal’ dimen-
sion of television’s insertion in, and articulation with, the context and prac-
tices of everyday life” (Morley, 1993: 276, original emphasis). Transposed 
into the outlined agenda of this paper, the latter synthesis obliges us to attend 
the interdisciplinary nature of ‘democratic entertainment’, precisely at the 
intersection of cultural studies, political economy and political communica-
tions, all of which will be considered in the following case study of a televi-
sion show. In ‘reading’ the programme, we will not focus on media con-
sumption per se, but on the representational qualities of textual exemplifica-
tions, in grasping some aspects of the implied mode of social self-mainte-
nance. This approach rests on a limitation immanent to such textual ‘read-
ing’, which, as Fiske wrote, “may be able to identify a text’s popular poten-
tial, but it can only speculate whether or how this potential will be actual-
ised” (1989b: 189). 
 
Popular entertainment with triangular arguments  
 Decades have gone by since the BBC, the European flag-bearer of public 
service broadcasting (cf. Scannell, 1989), started nourishing the idea of dis-
passionate public debate as rational deliberation, recognised by many as “the 
cornerstone of democratic culture” (Murdock, 2002: 202). Political elite 
members that normally appear in news and current affairs on Croatian public 
service television are also invited to discuss a wide range of national and in-
ternational issues in the programme “The Pyramid”, but in a manner that 
demystifies much of what has long been reserved for ‘elite’ political pro-
grammes in the media. “The Pyramid” is a prime time entertainment televi-
sion programme, which centres around heated discussions of the week’s 
topics in the news. They are rendered as a game, in which the contestants 
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win the viewers’ votes, the viewers win cash, and the process of democracy, 
as I seek to imply, wins an increased popular interest in critical evaluations 
of politics. 
 Three contestants are selected for each episode from a range of public 
roles: politicians, athletes, artists, celebrities, pundits, commentators, econo-
mists, theorists, historians, etc. Each contestant takes position on one of the 
three corners of a triangular studio setting, with three groups of studio audi-
ences behind each speaker, ready to react on verbal fires shot within. In the 
middle stands a moderator, who embodies both an appealing television host 
and a renowned journalist, moderating the programme and stirring the de-
bate with follow-up questions. The winner is the contestant for whom most 
television viewers vote via telephone lines. One of the viewers is selected 
randomly by the computer from the incoming telephone calls and is awarded 
a cash prize. The programme is organized as a tournament consisting of 
rounds, leading ‘pyramidically’ to the grand finale, in the 40th episode.  
 From the very opening to the last second of the broadcast, the show pro-
ducers are eager to entertain their audience (and themselves), and simultane-
ously enhance the citizens’ position-taking. The camera opens from the back 
of the studio, exposing the backstage technical equipment, with guests chat-
ting in the lobby of the building and a nervous stage assistant, who gives 
signals to the workers to start opening the pyramidical set in which the de-
bates take place, and shows the guests into the studio. During the show the 
cameras briefly cut to the assistants with headphones in the darkness, who 
are often seen laughing at what is being said, or to backstage preparations of 
the female singers trio, which pops in three times between the topics with a 
sixty-second advertisement-like song, which comments on the development 
of the competition and implies possible ratings of contestants. These and 
other cut-aways, I would argue, play one of the key roles in contributing to 
the democratic quality of the entertainment text of which they form a part. 
The effect is threefold:  
• Firstly, the cut-away shots entertain the viewers by exposing to them pri-
vate reactions of the individuals that take part in the production of the 
show; in this way the cut-aways also help in fighting the threat of bore-
dom; 
• Secondly, the cut-aways blur the classic distinction between the medi-
ated front stage and the back stage (cf. Thompson, 1995), creating an 
impression (however illusionary it may be) that there is no hidden ‘back-
stage’, no tacit ‘producer-receiver’ divide, and that everyone who ap-
pears before the viewers and whom the viewers may imagine is left un-
seen (e.g. the assistants) is involved, which may effectively work as a 
subtle invitation to the viewers to join in the gathering; and 
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• Thirdly, the cut-aways comment on what is being discussed. For exam-
ple, when the topic was euthanasia, quick close-up shots enabled us to 
see what speakers with particular standpoints wore around their necks 
(some had Christian crosses, others tattoos, etc.). Thus, the visual collage 
additionally communicated or attempted to comment on verbal political 
position-taking by providing specific cues for comprehension. This 
helped to increase the viewers’ sensibility for visual details, which, at 
times, may reveal more than the speakers would normally allow, and are 
otherwise inaccessible to the inattentive eye. 
 Each of the five topics is an issue selected from the previous week’s 
news items that strongly stirred public attention. The issues are decomposed 
in nine-minute discussions, after being introduced by a thirty-second video 
clip accentuating the proposed intrigue. One of the guests is entitled to start 
and has one minute to introduce the debate, and no one has the right to inter-
rupt them. Immediately after that, other guests can start with their sixty-sec-
ond expounding of views, and they all have an additional ‘right on rebuttal’, 
which enables them to interrupt the current speaker and immediately ex-
pound their own views16. Normally, the contestants call upon the moderator 
to let them speak, but often they subtly manage to bypass him and interject a 
murmured or quick remark to their opponents’ views. The cameras do not 
fail to show it. Nonetheless, the debate in “The Pyramid” is promoted to the 
mass audiences as a rule-governed, meaningful and, quite simply, interesting 
public practice. Diversity of meanings is foregrounded as necessary; each 
opinion is treated as highly contestable and worthy of attention. All the more 
so since, as theory instructs us, the arrangement of “talking ‘head to head’” 
implies “the excitement of the unrehearsed, the spontaneous and the authen-
tic” (Murdock, 2002: 199). The contestants, supported by the cheering audi-
ence, strive throughout the show to elaborate their particular positions, often 
using dialect, slang, personal stories, jokes, metaphors and general knowl-
edge (or lack of it). This is not unusual for a game-show format, as it is de-
veloped in the Western television culture: it has always featured “a combi-
nation of slapstick, humour, public humiliation and practical joke” (Whan-
nel, 1992: 191). The contestants in “The Pyramid” often draw on common 
meanings that have already been affirmed as such in everyday public de-
bates, then they critically evaluate them and, finally, juxtapose them to some 
trivial or (in their view) similarly relevant occurrence in contemporary na-
tional and/or world history. 
 In “The Pyramid”, celebrities are seen expressing their political views, 
thus making an exceptional public appearance per se, whilst politicians are 
seen doing it in an exceptional way: here they do draw on demagogic utter-
 
16 From “Excerpts From the Rules of the Pyramid”, available on www.pyramid-show.tv. 
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ances, but they do not make promises, and do not hesitate to show agreement 
with and support for an opponent’s view. Consequently, this is where view-
ers can see a politician and a celebrity in quite a different register than one 
would expect in the standardised forms of news on the one hand, and celeb-
rity features on the other. In this way, I would argue, the presented opinions 
manage to attract more viewers’ attention, which is accentuated by the fact 
that the show is broadcast live. From these instances, another important as-
pect is derived. 
 The studio set, with so many people reacting to the current speaker, but 
respecting his say, gives a sense of a group setting in which – regardless of 
the kind of view that is being expressed – the members are at the very least 
acknowledged on the grounds of group (i.e. show) membership. It is not my 
intention to romanticise an entertainment-driven discussion that sometimes 
turns into a small communicational chaos, but to recognise a formation, 
which, by means of prime-time national broadcasting, facilitates diverse 
evaluations of shared social shortcomings. No guest in “The Pyramid” seri-
ously believes that they could offer a panacea for the problem that is in 
question, but they approach their participation as an opportunity to speak 
humorously of problems by letting countless aspects of a topic amuse them, 
from a speaker’s strong accent or their outfit, to associations, metaphors and 
examples they may use. On the face of it, every member of the studio audi-
ence also participates, by cheering, laughing, gesturing approval or disap-
proval, whispering to a person they sit next to, etc. If such reactions also take 
place in the micro-spaces of television viewers, ‘democratic entertainment’ 
is given an important additional impetus. In line with van Zoonen’s (2005) 
exposition, as soon as a viewer hears an opinion regarding a relevant politi-
cal issue on an entertainment show and works on it in its own micropolitical 
space (Fiske, 1989b), the entertainment starts to fulfil a democratic function. 
It is perhaps enough, at the very least, to register an ardent disagreement of 
an audience member with a particular politician, expressed straight in their 
face, in a unique opportunity to talk back to them, as it were (cf. ibid.).  
 For the purposes of this case study I will provide three illustrations of the 
outlined points, with excerpts from the debates, which generally consist of:  
• Evaluating public behaviour,  
• Debating politics, and  
• Negotiating national identity. 
 In one of the episodes17, a noted press commentator and editor Ivo Pu-
kanić, a right-wing politician Anto Ðapić and a left-wing politician Željka 
 
17 From: The Pyramid. A television programme. Production: Castor Multimedia and Croa-
tian Television. HTV1, 19 December 2004, 2100hrs. 
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLIV, (2007.), No. 5, pp. 179–202 193 
                                                                                                                            
Antunović were to discuss the case of the then Minister of Health, a right-
wing politician Andrija Hebrang. He flew to Austria for a prostate operation, 
with the justification that their methods would allow him to return to work 
with the shortest delay. The prime time entertainment condemned the move: 
 
Pukanić: Hebrang’s act is an insult to all Croatian doctors and nurses. He 
should resign, just as the Slovene minister did in a similar case!  
[Audience cheering very strongly] 
… 
Antunović: It wasn’t until he became a patient that he became aware of the 
serious problems facing the health system here in Croatia! 
Pukanić: Of course, because he is responsible for them. He criminalized the 
reform that was under way before he became minister. 
… 
Ðapić: But why not apply the same principle to all ministers? According to 
the same logic, the minister of tourism should not go abroad for his holiday. 
Pukanić: Mr Ðapić’s theory does not hold. We should be allowed to travel 
where we please, but these are health issues! If the man at the helm doesn’t 
trust those he’s responsible for, why should we trust Hebrang or the national 
health service?! 
[Audience cheering very strongly] 
 
 A short news item was here deepened by a range of views, contesting the 
news actor with a kaleidoscope of individual understandings. Much more 
complex political issues were also debated, such as the issue of privatising 
the grand tourist facilities on the southern coast of Croatia18. A right-wing 
politician Ðuro Perica, a left-wing literary Branislav Glumac, and an eccen-
tric aerobics trainer Nataša Bebić, were given time to discuss the news that 
secret deals had been struck with a Luxembourg company to privatise hotels 
on the island Hvar. 
 
Bebić: We put everything on sale nowadays! They say politics is a whorish 
business. Well, to avoid the dirty word, I’ll use ‘the winding road’ – a Slove-
 
18 From: The Pyramid. A television programme. Production: Castor Multimedia and Croa-
tian Television. HTV1, 17 January 2007, 2000hrs. 
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nian equivalent. There are many winding roads to be sold in Croatia, and 
seemingly we have to invite others to buy them.  
[Audience applauding and cheering] 
Glumac: Politics is not a whore. We are! We make the deals! 
Bebić: It has to stop! Why do our [right-wing] elites go around the world to 
make business, they should spend their money here, in their homeland! They 
spend their holidays on Bali… 
Perica: Why don’t you join them? 
Bebić: … and they allow foreign citizens to buy our beautiful country! 
[Audience cheering very strongly] 
… 
The moderator: Reportedly, we get paid twice the salary in Romania and 
Bulgaria, although they already entered the EU. But they are ‘open’ to for-
eign investment. Is that why we still haven’t joined the EU? 
Perica: We’ll get there for sure. But it’s not an easy path for us Croats – 
look at the diversity of political opinion among us. They appreciate their 
countries more than some of us do. 
[Audience boos emotionally] 
Glumac: Isn’t it time that politicians, starting from the ignorant Prime Min-
ister, stop saying “we Croats” and refer to “Croatian citizens”, who include 
numerous minorities! 
[Audience cheers very loudly] 
Glumac: …because that’s what Europe is about: being a citizen. But – a 
great peril looms in the future. Intellectually, I cannot accept globalised 
Europe, where small nations always loose, but I will, for the sake of my sons, 
as I’m sure many of you will. 
(…) 
Bebić: We should all be acting like citizens of Croatia!… 
Perica: We “should”, yes, but why don’t you? 
Bebić: …Eurosceptics are so hypocritical!… 
[The sound announces the last three seconds of the show before the votes 
are stopped being taken in.]  
Bebić: …just look at what they wear! Max Mara, Versace! Why don’t they 
buy Croatian?! 
[Audience laughs and applauds] 
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 In the above-cited case, the information about a move in the national 
political economy was expanded with a set of standpoints that suggests vari-
ability in situating the piece of information in question in a number of 
cultural and social contexts. Croatian political culture and the issue of na-
tional identity were questioned when the same contestants discussed a public 
announcement by two Croats (opera diva Munitić, and an influential econ-
omy professor Stojanov), who claimed that, as Bosnian citizens, they could 
not cope with harassment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that they would 
come back to live in Croatia19. Croats are one of the three ethnic constituent 
peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Croatian ethnicity in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has been abundantly supported by the taxpayers’ money col-
lected in Croatia, which was a matter of controversy after the Yugoslav war 
in the early 1990s.  
 
Perica: You know, all this scepticism about their exodus tends to forget that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is the homeland of Croats… 
[Audience boos] 
Glumac: Rebuttal! This dangerously echoes imperialistic plans from the re-
cent past of this region! BiH is a separate state. It is NOT the Croatian 
homeland! 
[Audience applauds] 
Perica: I’m sorry that Mr Glumac doesn’t understand the difference between 
‘country’ and ‘state’. In my Croatian country I have lived in four states. The 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, nationalistic NDH, Tito’s guild… 
Glumac: But should we then support all of our diaspora? Croats live in 
Australia, France, England. Do they pay Croatian taxes? No!  
[Audience applauds and cheers] 
Bebić: Rebuttal! Oh, please! If you don’t want her in [the capital] Zagreb, 
let her come to [the coastal capital] Split and sing for the worker-teams re-
furbishing the city quays! They will work better! 
[Applause, laughter and cheering] 
Moderator: Do you think this is a start of an exodus trend? 
Bebić: Croats live all over the world and they won’t just pack up and leave. 
Being a Croatian patriot is the easiest when you live somewhere else. Why 
don’t they return and live on the low salaries we have here? 
 
19 From: The Pyramid . A television programme. Production: Castor Multimedia and Croa-
tian Television. HTV1, 17 January 2007, 2000hrs. 
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 The show fostered general discussion on a specific topic. It did not offer 
substantial insight into the essence of a given political issue, but it met the 
liberalist demand that the media should deliver a plurality of different opin-
ions as 
a way of promoting not truth, but public rationality based on dia-
logue; not rule devoid of error, but a system of self-determination in-
formed by freedom, choice, and a tradition of independence that 
comes from a civic debate (Curran, 2000: 138). 
 However, political communication has never treated entertainment with-
out reservations.  
 “The Pyramid” manages to provide a framework for debate about the so-
cial meanings of the surrounding realities, but at the same time it poses 
problems for the same democratic purposes it strives to serve. Although 
“The Pyramid” skilfully demonstrates that rational debate about a certain 
problem – albeit under the shiny studio lights and the demand for maintain-
ing visual appeal of appearance – may be transposed into a mediated space 
and time that fosters enjoyment, the programme may still leave the viewer 
only partly informed on the issue in question. In other words, it seems that 
the discussions tend to pose more questions than they are able to suggest an-
swers. A serious social issue disperses in a rush of capricious comments, 
fun-motivated interruptions and momentarily imposed digressions from the 
outlined topic. Critics can read such debates as oversimplifications of serious 
issues, or, in Graham Murdock’s words, as “replacing rational deliberation 
with emotive expression, and placing sensation above the search for feasible 
solutions” (2002: 202). However, this should not make us blind to the fact 
that, as Fiske asserts, popular texts are such  
to the extent that they avoid a more precise and preachy social real-
ism; they do not propose a “party line” of socially correct meanings, 
but offer contradictory and controversial representations, thus allow-
ing for producerly readings (1989b: 184).  
 Locating further problems, we are faced with the self-evident fact that 
only individuals previously acclaimed as public figures are endowed with 
the eligibility to discuss. Since the show does not recruit contestants from 
the audience, the question arises of social accessibility to the production of 
the entertainment text (cf. Curran, 2000; Hesmondhalgh, 2002). Notwith-
standing the fact that attentive viewers are awarded money prizes, the audi-
ence members are dislocated from the triangular arena, either to rooms 
where they sit in front of their TV sets, or behind the backs of the contest-
ants, limited to participation merely in collective reactions. Nonetheless, all 
these arguments do not annihilate the democratic potentials of media enter-
tainment, which “The Pyramid” introduces in our discussion. 
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 “The Pyramid” started in Croatia in 2004 as a public/commercial 
collaboration, in which the public service broadcaster treats its viewers as 
citizens, but with the help of commercial media management skills. The 
show is co-produced in Croatia by ‘Castor Multimedia’, a small independent 
television production company, which provides the original format, whereas 
Croatian Television (‘HTV’) secures the technical personnel and the studio. 
‘Castor Multimedia’ sold the show as a licensed programme to commercial 
and public service broadcasters in five other South-East European states, 
bringing revenues to television companies by securing high viewership for 
the niche advertisers and by collecting money from the viewers’ tele-voting 
for contestants. “The Pyramid” reached the peak of its success when it was 
named the world’s best at the 2007 “Rose d’Or Competition” of distin-
guished entertainment productions, in the category of game show formats. 
Thus, hand in hand with the thrust for economic success in reaching top 
market shares, the show does perform an important civic move in entertain-
ment20: the viewers are attracted to watch the show as consumers (cash baits 
in trailers offer prizes for the ones that call to vote), but then they are treated 
as citizens in an arena where every opinion, however controversial it may be, 
is welcome, and where there simply is no single truth21.  
 
Conclusion 
 In response to a tasteless joke by a comic at a party rally, Margaret 
Thatcher said that she wouldn’t take the joke seriously, since, as she as-
serted, humour is only humour (quoted in Street, 2001: 79). She could not 
have been more wrong. Nowadays, social science insists that “popular cul-
ture is part of the times, and indeed does not merely reflect it, but helps pro-
duce it” (Whannel, 1992: 199). 
 Cultural studies and political communications have embraced entertain-
ment texts as containers of relevant social representations, but at the same 
time the two strands made evident that the conflicted modernist and post-
modernist understandings of entertainment have their respective limitations 
(van Zoonen, 2005: 150-151). Drawing on relevant writings (van Zoonen, 
 
20 This is accentuated even more by the fact that in 2006, of all European public-broadcast-
ing systems, compared to their commercial competitors, Croatian public service Television (a 
part of Croatian Radiotelevision, “HRT”) had the highest public television viewership (Index.hr, 
2007). According to media commentators, one of the main assets which brought about such a 
success was the broadcast of "The Pyramid" (ibid.). 
21 Hence, “The Pyramid” could be seen as an extension of the public sphere, realised under 
conditions of television market competitions and commercialisation of appearances. Thus, the 
previously noted exclusions may only bring a postmodern twist to the exclusions already ob-
jected to Habermas’s (1989) model. 
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1998, 2005; Curran, 2000; Hermes, 2005), it is possible to conclude that me-
dia entertainment can apparently be effective for democracy, albeit it is ini-
tially meant to serve profit and mere pleasure. When soap operas, sit-coms, 
music videos, dramas, series, talk shows, even game shows, are read on the 
viewers’ micropolitical level, they enclose potentiality to support the process 
of democracy. Popular texts, previously condemned as residing in the realm 
of irrationality, are found in the realm of rational deliberation when consum-
ers work with them as active receivers, or consequently as informed voters. 
As Curran put it,  
people who are informed and active participants in civil society are a 
much more formidable and less biddable force than those who are 
only ‘active’ at the level of consumption (2000: 140). 
 In the case of “The Pyramid”, we saw that its contestants and audience 
members alike clearly are interested in ‘serious’ issues, but also that they 
think they need not be bored while these topics are being discussed. This 
does not legitimate media entertainment to be given responsibility of playing 
a substitutionary role to the traditional resources for participation and delib-
eration. But it does indeed legitimate it to function as a working subsidiary 
platform for democratic practices. The stakes are rather high, since “an en-
tertainment-only diet displacing public information and political debate is a 
recipe for passivity and social control” (Curran, 2000: 140). Social change, 
as Curran notes, requires “public information and political involvement” 
(ibid.). Yet, here we need to go a step further from the classic duality of in-
formation and entertainment, and recognise that they are closely interrelated 
within the framework of “democratic entertainment”, which, in this respect, 
calls for further theoretical development. The noted instance reflects a larger 
social process in which citizenship and consumerism reside in an ever-desta-
bilised opposition and whose divide is increasingly difficult to discern. Kees 
Brants et al. (1998: 1-5) recognise the common mediated form that this ac-
quires in a conflation of mere information and entertainment – in infotain-
ment, which encompasses all profit-driven media contents that draw on 
‘public’ objectives, scooping such diverse forms as news, current affairs and 
talk shows. Heejo Keum et al. (2004) provided some empirical support. 
Their quantitative research into the influence of both news and entertainment 
media on American consumer and civic cultures led them to conclude, with 
some reservations, that individual consumption and communal affiliation 
were not mutually opposed, but interconnected and mutually supportive 
forces, which was most ‘readable’ from the news texts (2004: 370, 383-384). 
Only by acknowledging this is the discussion about civic qualities of con-
suming media able to face the contemporary trends, in which they go 
through unprecedented restructuring, the further effects of which are yet to 
be explored. 
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 The case study of “The Pyramid” sought to demonstrate that “pleasures 
of popular culture not only have material impacts on the organization of so-
cial life, but they can be valued for their contribution to citizenship” (Her-
mes, 2005: 156), which touches at the heart of democratic entertainment. It 
fosters civic engagement in a media text by securing a platform for express-
ing otherwise neglected viewpoints. Being refreshingly devoid of intense 
outfoxing present in life-or-death battles for citizenry votes, as is usually 
seen in the standardised television panels, “The Pyramid” strives to keep the 
viewers’ interest in the show, by intersecting, quite successfully, the fight for 
popularity votes with entertainment. The viewers embraced such a concept, 
because they know, with impeccable lucidity, that there is much more to 
media entertainment than it may commonly seem.  
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